

SYMPOSIUM

Conscious Primitives and Their Reality

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Ricevuto: 23 giugno 2016; accettato: 3 luglio 2016

Abstract In *The Varieties of Consciousness*, Kriegel argues that it is possible to devise a method to sort out the irreducible primitive phenomenologies that exist. In this paper I argue that his neutrality notwithstanding, Kriegel assumes a form of realism that leaves unresolved many of the conundrums that characterize the debate on consciousness. These problems are evident in the centrality he assigns to introspection and his characterization of cognitive phenomenology.

KEYWORDS: Consciousness; Introspection; Realism; Type-identity; Dispositional Properties

Riassunto *I primitivi della coscienza e la loro realtà* – In *The Varieties of Consciousness* Kriegel sostiene la possibilità di concepire un metodo per mettere ordine tra le esperienze fenomenicamente primitive effettivamente esistenti, ciascuna nella propria irriducibilità rispetto alle altre. In questo testo intendo sostenere che, nonostante la sua neutralità, Kriegel assume una forma di realismo che lascia aperti molti dei problemi che caratterizzano il dibattito sulla coscienza. Questi problemi diventano evidenti sia nella centralità assegnata all'introspezione sia nella caratterizzazione specifica della fenomenologia cognitiva.

PAROLE CHIAVE: Coscienza; Introspezione; Realismo; Identità di tipo; Proprietà disposizionali



PHILOSOPHY IS FREQUENTLY CONSIDERED, by the lay person, as the domain of vague and foggy discussions. Consciousness, even among some philosophers, is considered to be the topic in which vagueness and metaphorical jargon prevails. So, consciousness is, in many respects, the fuzziest of intellectual activities. In *The Varieties of Consciousness*, Uriah Kriegel faces this problem head-on, devising a number of specific and detailed arguments and strategies for making the topic of consciousness less vague and demonstrates that it is a topic we should care about or, at least, have explicit reasons to care about.

The fundamental question of this book is to understand how many types of primitive phenomenology exist. By primitive phenomenology, Kriegel means types of experiences, that is, those internal happenings that guide, justify and promote our sensory, cognitive or intellectual life. Interestingly, he has a definitive and precise answer: there are six fundamental phenomenological types. Before getting into this, though, it is worthwhile understanding the general structure Kriegel has in mind.

The metaphysical realm of phenomenology and consciousness, according to Kriegel, is organized along a fundamental relation, the de-

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terminable/determinate one. This is the ordering relation that holds between items when these items are sorted using dependency relations. Consider colored items and red items. If something is *colored*, it is still undetermined what color it may be. If it is *red*, it is possible to more precisely determine its color. But there are many shades of red, of course.

So red is still determinable with respect to, say, crimson, and crimson is still determinable with respect to, say, crimson₁₄ as opposed to crimson₁₅, if we imagine that these numbers refer to some observer independent classification, perhaps one based on the spectroscopy of light reflection. So, the property of being colored opens a determinable / determinate relation that ends with individual colored entities of specific shades, which we may call the infimic determinates (see Ellis' *Scientific Realism*¹ for this view), that admit no further determination.

The relation of determination is to be distinguished from a similar relation, that between species and genus. For instance, in the genus (genre) of visual experiences you can have experiences of shapes and experiences of colors, and these do not compete with each other, in the sense that you can change colors while preserving shape or change shape while preserving color. So, in the genus perception there are at least two species, shape perceptions and color perceptions, which coexist in space and time. Vice versa, if you confront yourself with two colors, you cannot have them both in the same spot at the same time: same level determinates compete as qualities for a given entity, same level species do not necessarily do so.

Back to the original question: are there different types of phenomenal experience? The first move is to devise a method for answering this question, and Kriegel proposes the following (after a number of revisions and expansions):

- (1) introspective noticing of apparent phenomenal similarities; (2) abductive inference from said similarities to putative

phenomenal universals; (3) ordering of said universals into layers of phenomenal determinables; (4) identifying the phenomenal primitives in each layer of determinables; (5) identifying the phenomenal derivatives in each layer. The result is a web of phenomenal universals bearing grounding and determinability relations.²

It is at the end of the application of this method, which basically takes up the whole book, that the answer is provided: the most determinable layer is phenomenology *per se*, the very fact that there is an inner sense and an inner life that plays a fundamental role in our overall life experience. As such, phenomenology *per se* assumes different modes, and these compose the second determinable layer, the one that individuates all and only those types of phenomenology that are not the result of the interrelation of other phenomenologies.

These are: perceptual, algedonic (the phenomenology of pain and pleasure), cognitive (judging to be true), conative (deciding and acting rather than desiring), entertaining (that is, considering a proposition without taking a stance on it), imagining. Emotional and moral phenomenologies are taken to be the by-products of the other phenomenologies, variously combined.

Curiously, to my epistemological taste, Kriegel considers the problem of analyzing whether a given phenomenology can be dissolved in terms of other phenomenologies as a form of *reduction*. Reduction becomes, in a sense, an enterprise that applies to phenomenologies of the same layer, with no ontological twist.

So, for instance, in arguing that emotional phenomenology is the result of combining other types of phenomenologies, Kriegel is committed to saying that there are no primitive emotional experiences, and that, say, being scared is not a specific and not further analyzable kind of experience. I will not discuss this interesting point further for reasons of space.

The first problem I want to pose is the commitment to realism that is behind Kriegel's work.

Realism

Kriegel affirms that he doesn't take sides on the realist versus anti-realist debate over the nature of phenomenal states. Even if he seems to be inclined towards realism – «the most desirable view in this area is robust realism about phenomenal similarity, determinability, and grounding alike» – he declares that he prefers to «stay neutral on this issue».³

Clearly, Kriegel's attitude is a realist one, which is welcome by my standards, but the way he builds his argument presents the risk of overlooking many conundrums that are at the heart of the debate on consciousness. Let's start with a note that is apparently marginal. Kriegel insists that conscious phenomena are introspectively observable.⁴ "Observable" is a dispositional term, one that says that in some condition C a subject S introspects phenomenon P. This is the so-called simple conditional analysis of what dispositional terms amount to, and opens up a plethora of problems. For, if you are a realist about dispositions, then entities that have dispositional properties, have such properties even when they are not instantiated.

This means that if an entity is observable, then it is so even if no one observes it. But, in the case of phenomenal or conscious phenomena, this seems puzzling. For, how is it possible that a conscious phenomenon is there to be observed even when I do not attend to or "encounter" (as Kriegel says) it?

Being elements or, as I prefer to say, creatures of the mind, conscious phenomena are not free-floating entities, ready to be grasped by me or you on occasion. It seems that we cannot invoke a third platonic realm, the one invoked by Frege for locating meanings, to deposit phenomenal experiences. From a strictly phenomenal view, conscious phenomena *compose* my consciousness, in that there is nothing to my consciousness which is not in its stream. And this stream is a collection, gerrymandered and serendipitous as you wish, of these conscious phenomena, which are born, live and die once they are gone.

Sure, I can have memories of them, but a memory of a conscious phenomenon is different from a conscious phenomenon, as Kriegel is well aware, this being part of his distinction between "introspection proper" and "introspection loosely called". But Kriegel, as it turns out later in the book, thinks that phenomenal properties are categorical properties, that is, properties that are independent from the functional roles they may play and, according to many, to be contrasted with dispositional properties. So, calling phenomenal properties "observables" raises some problems with respect to the correct interpretation of these properties (is Kriegel defending a dual aspect view of properties as Heil⁵ does?)

The importance of this point is fully illuminated once one considers the role it has played in the debate over the type-identity theory of the mind. During the 50s, Smart, Armstrong and Place argued that types of mental states, and they were referring to "pain states", that is algedonic-conscious phenomena, are identical to types of physical states. This theory was abandoned after Kripke⁶ forcefully argued, using a different terminology but with I think the same gist, that conscious properties are token-reflexive properties. His point was that being in pain *is* feeling pain, and we cannot imagine someone having a certain phenomenal condition while not feeling it. At the same time, Kripke argued, it is possible for someone to undergo a certain conscious phenomenon without being in the physical state type isolated by some corresponding neural state. All this applies to the debate at hand in the following way.

The first is the one just mentioned: realism about conscious phenomena has to be construed as a *sui generis* realism, because the nature of these phenomena cannot be observer-independent: they exhaust themselves in being present to an observer. It is true that, when it comes to pain and pleasure, we try to avoid or seek them, but what we do is act by virtue of our, more or less, faded memories, not because of pain or pleasure in themselves. So, the functional role of pain is not

the role that determines what pain amounts to, *prima facie* contrary to the dispositional view. The categorical interpretation of these properties, then, takes their role to be independent of them.

However, being an immediate object of acquaintance is an essential role of these properties. That is, a property is phenomenal if and only if it is an immediate object of acquaintance. In describing phenomenality and introspection as distinct moments in our conscious life, Kriegel takes apart the core of the categorical view of phenomenal properties, the very coincidence of these two moments, a coincidence neglected by the identity theorists and criticized by Kripke. Therefore, his oscillation between a dispositional and a categorical view of properties remains as problematic.

A second and related problem is how to assess the robustness of introspection as a method to identify the phenomenal primitives belonging to the second layer. One may want to make sense of the idea that there is a way to settle whether two conscious phenomena are similar or whether one can be reduced to the other. The point is whether phenomenal similarity is introspection independent or not. Here the discussion over the type identity theory comes in handy again. Because, the type identity theorist was committed to the idea that phenomenal similarity is not dependent solely on introspection, in that there are objective facts regarding our conscious phenomena that allow for complete identification through equally objective physical phenomena. But that theory was discarded by the defenders of the non-reducibility of conscious phenomena.

In admitting the possibility of comparing, to settle the question of their similarity, two conscious phenomena, you being the subject of only one phenomenon at time, we are admitting that phenomenal entities are free-floating independently of our introspections. But how can this be?

Such a comparison is a metaphysical abstraction that goes beyond what real phe-

nomenology can allow you to do. One can be happy about the idea of such an abstraction but, first, it seems difficult to consider this while remaining neutral on the realism issue and, secondly, it leads to a further difficulty (more on this in the next section).

In examining this further difficulty, we should consider the impact of the previous point on Kriegel's general aim. Kriegel wants to sort out the structure of phenomenology in terms of properties as universals. Given the general procedures he adopts, such a structure is the result of the similarity judgements given by conscious beings. It is we, the conscious beings, that may determine, to use his example, whether "phenomenal-yellow₁₇-ness is more natural than weekday-phenomenal-yellow₁₇-ness", and therefore whether arguments regarding the naturalness of the first (endorsed by the realists) are to be preferred to arguments related to the usefulness of the second (endorsed by the anti-realists). Now, establishing a preference for either of these arguments entails establishing which *sui generis* phenomenal types populate the second-layer, or even if there is the first unique layer of phenomenology *per se*.

Consequently, if phenomenology is a matter of convenience, usefulness or some other pragmatic considerations, then the very first layer could be something like phenomenology for *x*, where *x* could be suitably replaced by a population, a population in some historical moment, or what not. But even accepting phenomenology *per se* as the common ancestor, the situation repeats itself at the second layer. In this case, for instance, we may establish that algedonic phenomenology is to be merged with conative phenomenology, if one takes into account recent arguments in favor of a view of pain as a form of imperative, for instance, the one put forward by Colin Klein.⁷

The arguments marshaled by Klein support that view that pains, pretty much like thirst, hunger and the like, are standing commands given to the body. Pain, in particular, is the command to remove the body, or a part of it, from certain conditions or situa-

tions. The fact that pain determines suffering, continues Klein, «is not a feature of pain: it is a response to pain. This means that suffering is only contingently connected to pain, and hence that pains only contingently hurt and feel bad».⁸

Consequently, the phenomenology of pain is not essential and primitive to it. Rather, what is essential to pain is its command role, the one it exercises on the body, eventually protecting it. Accepting such a view entails, in the light of Kriegel's proposed structure of phenomenal reality, equating algedonic phenomenology to some form of conative phenomenology, thus reducing the number of phenomenal types belonging to the second layer to five instead of six, and moving from a categorical to a dispositional view of phenomenal properties. Clearly, there may be arguments in support of splitting some of the phenomenal universals belonging to perceptual phenomenology, if the interests and the pragmatic purposes are different, thus arriving at six again, but this splitting could even result in seven or eight universals if this comes in handy.

■ Introspection

Having set the metaphysical framework in which judgements on phenomenal encounters have to be placed, it is time to consider how these *encounters* happen and to evaluate the role of similarity and dissimilarity in introspection. At bottom two claims determine what Kriegel calls "introspective minimalism", the view that introspection has a minimal but reliable epistemic value. These are above-chance reliability and non-negligible potency:

[ACR] If subject S introspects having phenomenology P, then S is more likely to have P than if S does not so introspect

[NNP] If subject S has phenomenology P, then S is more likely to introspect having P than if S does not have P.⁹

Basically, contrasting these principles by

means of a perceptual example, Kriegel insists with regard to the first, that if you smell raspberries it is more probable that there are raspberries around and, with regard to the second, if there are raspberries around then it is probable you will smell them.¹⁰ As one can appreciate, the perceptual model is deeply in the realism tradition, and it assumes that phenomenology and its introspection are distinct entities of our consciousness. So, this means that if you have a, so to speak, "cold of consciousness", you can fail to introspect a phenomenology you have, as happens if you fail to smell the raspberries you have in your hands. But is this possible? In what sense can you encounter a phenomenology if you cannot access it?

The fact is that introspecting seems the only way to access our phenomenological encounters. So, it is not clear how there can be phenomenological features if no one can introspect them. A clue to an answer comes from some sort of inferences Kriegel considers to be involved in our introspective activity, considered as a method.

The analysis starts by pointing out that there could be cases of introspective disagreements, that is differences between subjects concerning the nature of an experience. Such disagreements are in my view possible, even without committing oneself to the distinction between introspection and phenomenology. But the problem remains: could we make sense of them without assuming the robustness of introspection from the very beginning. How so?

Kriegel argues that some may reject the very idea of introspective disagreement because there would be no fact of the matter to settle this issue. But Kriegel is right in dismissing this view as an overreaction. A further view is that of *phenomenal variability*.¹¹ Individuals may differ in sensitivity, and this difference surfaces in their ability to introspect their own phenomenology. This view is ok in many cases, but cannot sustain the burden of adjudicating the phenomenal determinables belonging to the second layer. In this case, Kriegel insists that we should admit

the possibility that one of the parties of the disagreement is *wrong*.

The mistake, Kriegel continues, could be due to different *introspective competence*. He recognizes that we might exhibit different levels of expertise in our capacity to judge and evaluate our phenomenal encounters. Clearly, such criteria are difficult to apply in practice, so he looks for further supplemental arguments to defend introspection.

A very interesting case is the deductive-bypass approach. The idea is to use introspective statements as premises for deductive reasoning. Kriegel refers to Moore and Strawson's arguments in which two people, of which only one knows French, are phenomenally compared. It seems that (i) their overall phenomenology is different while (ii) their pure sensory (phonetic?) phenomenology is the same. Hence, (iii) there must be some non-sensory phenomenology. Kriegel thinks that this is a good argument, even if not the best one, to defend and manage introspective disagreement, and that the problem with the argument is that it cannot work without any introspective premise: you cannot derive a phenomenological conclusion without some phenomenological premise.

However, I think there is a further problem with this argument. I used this argument, unaware of the Moore and Strawson versions, while discussing Searle's Chinese room argument.¹²

I argued that, for instance, semantic knowledge of French as a second language is the passage from morpho-syntactic performance (saying "[vwa:tyR]") to semantic competence (knowing one is saying "voiture", namely car). This passage, though, is possible only if one accepts the idea that there is something like a purely sensory phenomenology to be contrasted with an overall phenomenology, one which, presumably, sums the sensory with the non-sensory phenomenology. But here the argument is marshalled in order to individuate the second-layer phenomenal primitives, and the existence of this distinction belongs, if I get

Kriegel's grand picture right, just to *this* level. Hence, this argument begs the question of the fundamental phenomenal primitives because it uses this difference in the premises.

So, Kriegel refers to a non-deductive argument to get to a phenomenological conclusion via an inference to the best explanation. Here he adopts an argument by Pitt and Goldman, nicely reconstructed, which goes as follows:

- P1) Subject S has immediate non-inferential knowledge of some cognitive state S is in;
- P2) If some of S's cognitive states have an irreducible phenomenology, this would best explain S's immediate, non-inferential knowledge of them; therefore (by inference to the best explanation);
- C1) Some of S's cognitive states have an irreducible phenomenology; and therefore
- C2) There is such a thing as irreducible phenomenology.¹³

So, introspection disagreement could be inferred via divergence in non-inferential knowledge between two subjects by assuming, as the best explanation available, that they have a different phenomenal encounter.

He defends the importance of adopting introspection as an epistemic resource to gain knowledge on phenomenal experience by pointing out that cognitive science, supposedly remote to the use of introspection, is either insufficient as a science of the mind, when it comes to facing phenomenal consciousness, or is far from being free of introspective acts. To argue in favor of this second disjunct Kriegel describes the famous debate on mental imagery, initiated by Roger Shepard and then forcefully pursued by Stephen Kosslyn.¹⁴

In the experiments on mental imagery, subjects were asked to check whether two images of complex shapes depicted the same object rotated a number of degrees or a specular copy of the object. Shepard found that if

the two shapes were rotated about 53 degrees, then the response arrived after a second. He made the hypothesis that the rotational speed of what Kosslyn called the “visual buffer”, was 53° per second. Introspection is thus indirectly vindicated in terms of inference to the best explanation.

However, I doubt that Kriegel is fair with respect to the way in which cognitive science has tackled the problem. In fact, Kosslyn has shown that the ability to estimate the speed of rotation, basically common to all human beings, is a feature of the visual buffer, not one of our introspective abilities. If it were dependent on introspection, there would be differences between people, since it is difficult to imagine that our introspective abilities are all on a par. Rather, we rely on introspection once the visual buffer has done its job and the result (same shape or mirror shape?) pops out in our mind. It seems to me, then, that the case for the reliability of introspection is still waiting to be made.

■ Cognitive phenomenology

The second layer of the determinable / determinate relation comprises cognitive phenomenology. According to Kriegel, cognition, in particular belief, has a phenomenology of its own. This phenomenology is fundamentally characterized by presenting the content of beliefs as true. So, if one believes that *p*, the phenomenal attitude is one of presenting *p* as true, and this determines the functional roles typical of believing something true. So, contrary to what functional role semantics has held, we do not believe something to be true because its functional role is such-and-such, but the functional role is the one we observe because we believe it is true, that is, we have the attitude of presenting it as true.

In order to ground this attitude, Kriegel refers to the idea that such attitudes are categorical properties, as opposed to dispositional properties. But this is not enough; in fact, also perceptual phenomenology can be thus characterized. The further distinguishing

feature, then, is that cognitive phenomenology is non sensory. This feature distinguishes cognitive phenomenology from phenomenology *per se*. So, how can phenomenology *per se* be described?

Phenomenology *per se* is defined by recurring to the idea of an explanatory gap. The expression “explanatory gap”, originally from Levine, identifies the fact that a complete physical explanation of any phenomenal episode is doomed to some sort of incompleteness, one that leaves out what seems to be the very gist of the experience itself. So, an explanation of what happens to me when I have a sip of nice wine, will enlist the activation of my receptors and brain areas, leaving out the kind of pleasure I have while the wine was stimulating my receptors and phenomenally invading my attention.

In order to obtain phenomenological reduction, the explanatory gap is analyzed in terms of failure of deducibility, which is the inability to deduce phenomenal facts from facts concerning structure and function, these two being the facts that presumably explain the workings of the brain. So, we end up by taking phenomenality to be a categorical property that determines a rationally warranted appearance of an explanatory gap with respect to physical properties.¹⁵

Generalizing from this, in defining what is primitive cognitive phenomenology, Kriegel builds up the following argument: (i) there are inner episodes that present some content as true; (ii) such episodes have a warranted appearance of an explanatory gap (thus qualifying as phenomenal); (iii) such episodes are irreducible to any other kind of phenomenology (sensory, algedonic, conative, etc.); therefore, (iv) there is an irreducible cognitive phenomenology.¹⁶

The challenging premise, to my eyes, is the second one. The whole argument is defended by a thought experiment starring Zoe, a fully functional but phenomenally deprived person, that suffers from some radical imaginary form of non-*x/x*-ing where *x* stands for any sensory modality (so, she is “blindsight”, “deafhearing”, and so on). How are we to

make sense of Zoe?

It is natural to turn to Ned Block's distinction between two varieties of consciousness, access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. The first is described like this:

P-consciousness is experience. P-conscious properties are experiential properties. The totality of experiential properties of a state are "what it is like" to have it [...] P-conscious properties include all the experiential properties of sensations, feelings, and perceptions, but I would also include thoughts, wants and emotions.¹⁷

A-consciousness, vice versa, is:

A is access consciousness. A state is A-conscious if is directly poised for control of thought and action. To add more detail, a representation is A-conscious if it is poised for free use in reasoning and for direct "rational" control in action and speech (the "rational" is meant to rule out the kind of control that obtains in blindsight).¹⁸

Block's remark in parentheses is used to stress that actual blindsight patients do not have A-consciousness because, for example, a thirsty subject can recognize her state of water deprivation but is not able to use the information that there is a bottle in her visual field, supposing there is one, to quench it.

Zoe, however, is described as a person who is able to solve mathematical problems but derives no felt joy from solving these. Zoe, then, resembles the superblindsight person imagined by Block, one that can force herself to guess what is in her blind field. It seems to me that Zoe can be imagined like this in coherence with the description given by Kriegel.

The point of the argument is that the inner experiences of Zoe are such as to present a specific cognitive phenomenology but no sensory phenomenology, thus showing the irreducibility of the former to the latter. It is my contention that if Zoe has some primitive phenomenology, then a computer appropri-

ately programmed has it as well. Zoe's consciousness lies in the vividness with which she imagines the mathematical solutions or the different steps of her proofs. But why can't we "functionalize" such vividness?

Consider chess programs: these rank moves preferences by virtue of their values in the short and medium time strategies they determine. Ranking and preferences can be explained without generating any gap, but by assigning numerical values. By removing all the sensory components of Zoe's inner life, Kriegel has removed too many things, he has removed the consciousness he is looking for. Zoe is some sort of super-blindsight person, one that a computer program, or a robot for that matter, can be as well. Zoe incarnates the form of access-consciousness that the superblindsight person imagined by Block has, that is, a state with a content that is part of inferences and may determine action. But this kind of state is the kind of explicit content that computer programs, either controlling robots or those which just simulate actions, are supposed to provide to justify their conclusions or the actions performed. So, if the Zoe argument is effective, it not only shows that there is a *sui generis* and irreducible primitive form of cognitive consciousness, but it shows that there is no explanatory gap left.

An indirect way to show that the explanatory gap is no longer there, is by considering the lists of platitudes that are provided in the attempt to formulate Ramsey sentences that have to pinpoint the various phenomenal states composing the second layer of the cognitive phenomenology.

First of all, the way in which these phenomenal states are individuated is by re-describing their logical nature. So, for instance, "doubting that p" is taken to be fully analyzable in terms of the "inability to judge whether p". But if this is the proper analysis, why is that creating any explanatory gap?

As such, a robot can doubt whether p because the weights to the various alternatives are not strong enough to constitute a reason for one choice over the other. So, if doubting

that *p* is the inability to judge whether *p*, then *p* can be perfectly attained without imagining that something has been left out, as the explanatory gap suggests.

Secondly, I wonder whether such analyses are on the same phenomenal level of their analysans; alternatively said, do these represent unintended proto-reductive analyses of cognitive phenomenology? Consider again the “inability to judge whether *p*”: where is the phenomenal part of this analysis? Is it in the “inability to” or is it in the “inability to judge”?

If the former, then it may recur in other primitive phenomenologies, for there could be cases of “inability to” also in perception, as the inability to distinguish between two shades of color. But this inability would not constitute a primitive phenomenal quality only for cognition. If the primitive component is the “judging”, then how are we to understand the phenomenology of judging, that sometimes recurs as explanandum (platitude 6) and sometimes as explanans (platitude 10)?

The point is that if some cognitive phenomenal state is analyzed by other attitudes that enter, in turn, into other cognitive phenomenal states, then, if my case against Zoe’s argument is solid, cognitive phenomenology, as a whole, admits a non-phenomenal reading.

In *The Varieties of Consciousness*, Uriah Kriegel has done an important job in pinning down the various aspects of phenomenology that are frequently left to our intuition to explore without a clear guide to help us. Kriegel provides such a guide, and I’m still in doubt whether the blind and dark spots that I have tried to point out are limits of the guide or features of the path.

Notes

¹ See B. ELLIS, *Scientific Essentialism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007.

² U. KRIEGL, *The Varieties of Consciousness*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2015, p. 16.

³ *Ivi*, p. 19.

⁴ *Ivi*, p. 20.

⁵ See J. HEIL, *From an Ontological Point of View*, Oxford University Press, New York 2003.

⁶ See S. KRIPKE, *Naming and Necessity*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA) 1980.

⁷ See C. KLEIN, *What the Body Commands: The Imperative Theory of Pain*, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA) 2015.

⁸ *Ivi*, pp. 46-47.

⁹ U. KRIEGL, *The Varieties of Consciousness*, cit., p. 24.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*.

¹¹ I have explored this possibility in arguing against Kripke’s argument over the type-identity theory of the mind. See S. GOZZANO *Type-Identity Conditions for Phenomenal Properties*, in: S. GOZZANO, C. HILL (eds.) *New Perspectives on Type Identity*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2012, pp. 111-126.

¹² See S. GOZZANO, *Consciousness and Understanding in the Chinese Room*, in: «Informatica», vol. XIX, special issue, 1995, pp. 653-656.

¹³ U. KRIEGL, *The Varieties of Consciousness*, cit., p. 33.

¹⁴ See S. KOSSLYN, *Image and Mind*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA) 1980.

¹⁵ U. KRIEGL, *The Varieties of Consciousness*, cit., p. 53.

¹⁶ *Ivi*, p. 61.

¹⁷ N. BLOCK, *On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness* (1995), in: N. BLOCK, O. FLANAGAN, G. GÜZELDERE (eds.), *The Nature of Consciousness*, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA) 2007, pp. 375-415, here p. 380.

¹⁸ *Ivi*, p. 382.